Consumer Crossroads: Where Financial Services and Litigation Intersect

Hinshaw continues to monitor the deepening circuit split over what constitutes an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which restricts certain automated calls and text messages. To say there has been substantial debate by the courts and FCC concerning what constitutes an ATDS would be putting it lightly. And, just when it seemed a majority position was emerging, the playing field seems to have leveled with the Second Circuit's decision in Duran v. La Boom Disco, Inc.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued an en banc decision in Riccio v. Sentry Credit, overturning Graziano v. Harrison, after finding that there is no written dispute requirement in Section 1692g(a)(3) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). According to the court, this decision ends "a circuit split and restores national uniformity to the meaning of §1692g." Moreover, the decision applies retroactively to any claim still open on the issue, thus closing the chapter on a written requirement for Section 1692g.

We now have a split among federal circuits regarding the definition of an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS), under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which limits automated calls and text messages. What constitutes an ATDS has been debated both by the FCC and courts for quite some time. In 2008 and 2015, the FCC found that all predictive dialers were automated telephone dialing systems under the TCPA. In Marks v. Crunch San Diego in 2018, the Ninth Circuit, held that the TCPA applies to devices with the capacity to automatically dial telephone numbers from a stored list or devices that dial telephone numbers produced from a random or sequential number generator. Now, in Glasser v. Hilton Grand Vacations and Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc., the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits have taken the opposite approach and found that an ATDS only includes equipment that dials randomly or sequentially.

Earlier this year, this blog reported on the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Rotkiske v. Klemm to resolve a split in circuits on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's (FDCPA) statute of limitations. This week, in an 8:1 opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court concluded that the one-year statute of limitations in the FDCPA begins to run when the violation occurs, not when the violation is discovered. In doing so, they overturned rulings by the Fourth and Ninth Circuit, which had held the FDCPA's statute of limitations was subject to equitable tolling.

The Eleventh Circuit, in Salcedo v. Hanna, has concluded that receipt of a single unsolicited text, allegedly sent in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (the "TCPA"), does not constitute a sufficient "concrete injury" to confer standing under Article III of the United States Constitution.

Less than three months after hearing oral arguments in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, Case No. 17-1307, the United States Supreme Court held, in a 9-0 decision, that a business engaged in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings is not a "debt collector" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA, "the Act"), except for the limited prohibitions set forth in 1692(f)(6). The decision provides helpful guidance to law firms and loan servicers who pursue nonjudicial foreclosures.

As we predicted last year, the United States Supreme Court earlier this week granted Plaintiff's petition for certiorari in Rotkiske v. Klemm to resolve a split in the circuits on whether the statute of limitations for a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claim begins when the alleged violation occurred (known as the "occurrence rule") or when the consumer discovers the alleged violation (known as the "discovery rule").

For mortgage servicers and foreclosure firms, yesterday's oral argument before the Supreme Court in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, U.S. Supreme Court, 17-1307 and the upcoming decision, could be a game changer. At issue: a split in the federal circuits over whether the non-judicial foreclosure of a mortgage constitutes debt collection, as defined by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court held on June 11, 2018 that a pending motion for class certification does not toll the statute of limitations for the filing of a new class action lawsuit by a putative class member. Writing for the majority in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg repeatedly emphasized that the "efficiency and economy of litigation" is not promoted by allowing less than diligent plaintiffs to file a new, but time-barred, class action lawsuit. Clarifying the Court's prior holding in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), Justice Ginsburg wrote that "[e]ndless tolling is not the result envisioned by American Pipe."