Consumer Crossroads: Where Financial Services and Litigation Intersect

In New York civil actions, where a defendant fails to answer the complaint, the next step is usually a motion for a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215. However, in residential mortgage foreclosure actions, the plaintiff is generally required to file a Request for Judicial Intervention ("RJI") to seek the scheduling of a settlement conference pursuant to CPLR 3408.

A highly contested and controversial legal defense to residential foreclosures in Maine resurfaced earlier this month with the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Finch v. U.S. Bank, N.A.

In Montaquila v. Flagstar Bank, the Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected a borrower's attempt to expand the plain language of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) federal regulation requiring loan servicers of FHA-backed mortgages to conduct a face-to-face meeting or make a "reasonable effort" to arrange a face-to-face meeting with the borrower prior to foreclosing. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the regulation only requires a trip to the property to arrange a face-to-face meeting; the actual face-to-face meeting is not required at this visit.

An ever-expanding review of pre-foreclosure notices of default experienced its latest chapter in the First Circuit's recent decision reversing dismissal of suit in Aubee v. Selene. In Aubee, the borrowers challenged the notice of default they received prior to foreclosure on the grounds that the notice inserted additional language that was misleading and deceptive. The Aubees' mortgage included the standard Paragraph 22 notice of default disclosures requiring the mortgage lender to inform a borrower of the right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense to acceleration and sale. The Aubees' notice of default stated: "You have the right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to assert in the foreclosure proceeding the non-existence of a default and/or the right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense to acceleration, foreclosure and/or sale of the property." The Rhode Island federal court dismissed the case because the notice of default provided the Aubees with all disclosures mandated under Paragraph 22, but the First Circuit reversed.

In Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Ezeji, 2021 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3313 (2d Dep't, May 19, 2021), New York's Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed a judgment of foreclosure and sale, finding that although the mortgagee asserted it possessed the subject note before commencing the foreclosure and had complied with service of the statutory predicate notices pursuant to RPAPL 1304, it failed to introduce the actual business records evidencing these facts. The ruling is instructive for mortgagees and their servicers about the evidence they must provide in support of a prima facie case to foreclose.

On May 24, 2021, Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence Marks issued Administrative Order 159/21 (AO/159/21) to extend the stay of residential foreclosure actions through August 31, 2021, for cases in which the mortgagor submits a Hardship Declaration (the Declaration). AO/159/21 clarifies the uncertainty surrounding the deadline for submitting the Declaration, which was not addressed in the previous administrative order.

The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court's First Department recently issued a decision addressing the calculation of the six-month timeframe permitted to file a new action, according to New York's Civil Practice Law & Rules (CPLR) 205(a) and following the termination of a prior action. The First Department concluded that an action is timely if it is brought within six months of the termination of time to appeal a denial of a motion to renew.

The New York Court of Appeals issued two important end-of-the-year decisions on December 17, 2020 in a heavily litigated, affirmative defense in residential mortgage foreclosure actions: the lack of standing to foreclose.

On Monday, December 28, 2020, Governor Andrew Cuomo signed the COVID-19 Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020. Among other things, this legislation (S.9114/A.11181) extends certain residential foreclosure and eviction moratoria for renters and homeowners suffering hardship due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Massachusetts moved one step closer to resolving an ongoing debate over pre-foreclosure notices of default that started with the First Circuit's decision in Thompson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank back in February of 2019. Initially, the First Circuit concluded that a notice of default, which disclosed that borrowers "could still avoid foreclosure by paying the total past-due amount before a foreclosure sale," was potentially misleading because the mortgage only allowed reinstatement five days before the sale. Chase filed a petition for rehearing, joined by numerous amici, that demanded reconsideration of the First Circuit's decision on grounds that the potentially misleading language was in fact a mandatory disclosure under the Code of Massachusetts Regulations.

On July 24, 2020, the New York State Courts issued Administrative Order 157/20 (AO/157/20). Effective July 27, 2020, AO/157/20 removes the formal suspension of all residential foreclosures, but keeps a limited suspension of commercial foreclosures in place until August 19, 2020. Under this new directive, foreclosure actions can be resumed by courts first scheduling at least one conference. Those conferences are expected to be the same as the mandatory CPLR 3408 settlement conferences—even if settlement conferences were previously held—because the courts were directed to consider all aspects of the case, including "the effects, if any, that the COVID-19 pandemic has had upon the parties."

On April 20, 2020, Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker signed H.4647 into law. The law establishes a moratorium on foreclosures and evictions for 120 days from the date of the enactment, or 45 days after the COVID-19 Emergency Order is lifted, whichever is sooner, and also extends forbearance to any borrower who requests it due to COVID-19. The law allows the Governor to expand the foreclosure moratorium for a further 90 days, so long as it does not exceed the 45 day limit after the COVID-19 Emergency Order is lifted.

Earlier this year, Hinshaw reported on a decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals which invalidated a Massachusetts foreclosure based on the Court's determination that the mortgage loan servicer's notice of default included additional language which did not strictly comply with Paragraph 22 of the mortgage. In the wake of that decision, the servicer filed a petition for rehearing on several grounds, but primarily because the Code of Massachusetts Regulations required use of what the Court had characterized as additional language. The banking community also filed several amicus briefs in support of Chase's petition.

Under Massachusetts law, a foreclosing lender has a duty of good faith and reasonable diligence to obtain the highest possible price for a property at auction. Until recently, it was considered appropriate for the lender to make a credit bid up to the amount owed on the mortgage in order to satisfy this duty. However, a recent decision by the Massachusetts Appeals Court has expanded the duty of good faith and reasonable diligence beyond a review of the property's assessed or appraised fair market value. A property's development potential may also need to be reviewed in order to calculate an acceptable winning bid.

In Thompson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held a foreclosure was potentially void where terms in the lender's default notice arguably conflicted with terms in Paragraph 19 of the Mortgage. Although Chase's notice of default provided the Thompsons with the disclosures required under Paragraph 22 of the Mortgage, Chase's default notice further stated that the Thompsons "could still avoid foreclosure by paying the total past-due amount before a foreclosure sale takes place." The First Circuit interpreted this additional language as potentially misleading, because advising borrowers that they could make payment up to the time of the foreclosure sale differed from the Mortgage's Paragraph 19, which only allowed a reinstatement payment five days before the sale of the Property.

Last year, we reported on a Massachusetts Land Court decision, which interpreted Uniform Commercial Code section 3-309 to conclude that a mortgagee cannot foreclose in reliance upon a lost note affidavit, because the 1990 version of UCC 3-309 requires the party seeking to enforce the note demonstrate possession prior to its loss. 32 states remain under the 1990 version, and recently the Rhode Island Supreme Court joined decisions that prohibit enforcement of a lost note under this outdated version of the UCC. In SMS Fin. v. Corsetti, SMS Financial sued to enforce default on a note that was lost by a prior transferee. Sovereign Bank had loaned the defendants $1 million in exchange for a promissory note and a mortgage on property located at 385 South Main Street in Providence, Rhode Island. Following default and foreclosure, the defendants issued to Sovereign a new promissory note to repay the $200,000 deficiency on the original loan. Sovereign subsequently assigned its interest in the loan to SMS Financial; but, Sovereign had lost the original note so it delivered to SMS a lost note affidavit and an allonge. SMS filed suit against the defendants to collect on breach of the note, but the Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants because SMS could not enforce the lost note.

In Milone v. US Bank, N.A., a New York intermediate appellate court held that a letter to a borrower stating that the failure to cure a mortgage loan default "will result in acceleration" does not start the clock on the statute of limitations to foreclose and recover the entire debt. This ruling differs from that of another New York intermediate appellate court, which had ruled otherwise, setting up the possibility of the New York Court of Appeals weighing in on a key issue in New York foreclosure actions.

In Federal National Mortgage Association v. Thompson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court permitted a lender to pursue a second judicial foreclosure action after the first case was dismissed with prejudice. In the first foreclosure action, the lower court agreed with borrower Cory Thompson that his lender had failed to present evidence that a notice of intent to accelerate was mailed and that the servicer was in possession of the original note. After an unsuccessful appeal of the dismissal, the lender sent Thompson a new notice of intent to accelerate payment of the note and filed a second foreclosure action when no payments were received in response to the letter. Following trial of the second foreclosure action, the lower court granted judgment in favor of the lender. Thompson appealed, asserting that claim preclusion barred the second action.

In Lubonty v. U.S. Bank National Association, a mortgagor sought to void a mortgage loan claiming that the six-year statute of limitations to foreclose had expired. The mortgagor had commenced multiple bankruptcy proceedings that trigged automatic stays and prevented foreclosure from proceeding for approximately four and a half years. New York law, CPLR § 204, extends the statute of limitations "[w]here the commencement of an action has been stayed by a court or by statutory prohibition," and the trial court held that the six-year statute of limitations was extended by the time period during which the foreclosure was stalled through successive bankruptcy petitions.

In Dan-Harry v. PNC Bank, the Rhode Island federal court concluded that a mortgagor may bring a claim for damages and other remedies against a mortgagee on allegations of failure to conduct a pre-foreclosure face-to-face meeting required for breach of an FHA-insured mortgage. Dawari Dan-Harry obtained an FHA-insured mortgage loan to purchase property in Providence, Rhode Island, which included in Paragraph 9(d) the following provisions: "Regulations of HUD Secretary. In many circumstances regulations issued by the Secretary will limit Lender's rights, in the case of payment defaults, to require immediate payment in full, and foreclose if not paid. This Security Instrument does not authorize acceleration or foreclosure if not permitted by regulations of the Secretary." PNC Bank foreclosed on the mortgage and sold the property at auction to a third-party in January 2017. While continuing to occupy the property, Dan-Harry sued PNC for damages and to void the foreclosure sale on allegations that PNC failed to comply with HUD regulation 24 C.F.R. § 203.604(b), which requires a mortgagee to have a face-to-face meeting with the mortgagor or make a reasonable effort to arrange such a meeting before the mortgage becomes three months delinquent in payments.