Consumer Crossroads: Where Financial Services and Litigation Intersect

In New York civil actions, where a defendant fails to answer the complaint, the next step is usually a motion for a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215. However, in residential mortgage foreclosure actions, the plaintiff is generally required to file a Request for Judicial Intervention ("RJI") to seek the scheduling of a settlement conference pursuant to CPLR 3408.

Loan servicers and their counsel are often sued by consumers during contested mortgage foreclosure proceedings. The United States Supreme Court’s opinions in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins[1] and TransUnion v. Ramirez[2] continue to be an important precedent in defending consumer claims.

Last week, the Texas Supreme Court answered the Fifth Circuit’s certified question as to whether simultaneous rescission and reacceleration can reset the limitations period under Texas Law by holding that “a rescission that complies with the statute [Tex. Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 16.038] resets limitations even if it is combined with a notice of reacceleration.” Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 23-0525, 2024 Tex. LEXIS 156, at *2 (Feb. 23, 2024).

A highly contested and controversial legal defense to residential foreclosures in Maine resurfaced earlier this month with the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Finch v. U.S. Bank, N.A.

Last year, as we reported, the Second Circuit requested that the New York Court of Appeals rule on two certified questions concerning predicate notices in foreclosure actions. On March 30, 2021, the Court of Appeals issued its decision in Schiffman on the questions certified by the Second Circuit concerning New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) §§ 1304 (90-day predicate notice) and 1306 (pre-foreclosure filing with the superintendent of banks).

The New York Court of Appeals reversed four Appellate Division decisions and decided in favor of the mortgagees in a consolidated decision issued on February 18, 2021, ruling, inter alia, that:

The mortgage foreclosure world continues to experience change at a moment's notice. Lenders continue to defend against borrower actions seeking to discharge their mortgages as time-barred, which in turn has led to the development of several defenses supported by the appellate courts. Whether it is lack of standing to accelerate the mortgage debt, revocation, or re-affirmation of the debt, all of these defenses are not as interesting—and powerful—as full immunity from the statute of limitations. In Windward Bora, LLC v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, that's exactly what the Second Circuit found, and its decision could have a substantial impact for lenders in New York and elsewhere.

The New York Court of Appeals issued two important end-of-the-year decisions on December 17, 2020 in a heavily litigated, affirmative defense in residential mortgage foreclosure actions: the lack of standing to foreclose.

On July 24, 2020, the New York State Courts issued Administrative Order 157/20 (AO/157/20). Effective July 27, 2020, AO/157/20 removes the formal suspension of all residential foreclosures, but keeps a limited suspension of commercial foreclosures in place until August 19, 2020. Under this new directive, foreclosure actions can be resumed by courts first scheduling at least one conference. Those conferences are expected to be the same as the mandatory CPLR 3408 settlement conferences—even if settlement conferences were previously held—because the courts were directed to consider all aspects of the case, including "the effects, if any, that the COVID-19 pandemic has had upon the parties."

On June 17, 2020, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed Senate Bills 8243C and 8428 into law, adding Section 9-x to the Banking Law. The section creates new procedures for mortgagors and servicers in relation to forbearances of residential mortgage payments affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

In a case of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded in Woel v. Christiana Trust that mortgage default notices sent to borrowers must strictly comply with the notice requirements included in a mortgage. The Court held that a lender's notice of default does not strictly comply with the terms of the standard Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac mortgage Paragraph 22, if the notice fails to inform the borrower of the right to reinstate after acceleration.

On May 7, 2020, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo issued Executive Order 202.28, which provides further temporary relief measures for tenants facing an eviction. The order also directly impacts mortgage loan holders, servicers, and borrowers, as it bars the "initiation" of certain residential and commercial mortgage foreclosures for another 60 days from June 20, 2020.

On April 20, 2020, Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker signed H.4647 into law. The law establishes a moratorium on foreclosures and evictions for 120 days from the date of the enactment, or 45 days after the COVID-19 Emergency Order is lifted, whichever is sooner, and also extends forbearance to any borrower who requests it due to COVID-19. The law allows the Governor to expand the foreclosure moratorium for a further 90 days, so long as it does not exceed the 45 day limit after the COVID-19 Emergency Order is lifted.

The Second Circuit recently certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the requisite proof needed for borrowers to dispute the lender's compliance with New York Real Property Procedures and Acts ("RPAPL") § 1304 and the required filings under RPAPL § 1306 for a multi-borrower mortgage loan. The New York Court of Appeals has not yet ruled on these statutes and the requisite proof needed to comply with them. A decision on these issues could greatly impact the mortgage industry, given the impact of these statutes on mortgage foreclosure proceedings.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit has affirmed an earlier decision that concluded a borrower's right to redeem terminates when the gavel falls at a foreclosure auction, and not when a deed is recorded.

We previously discussed the State of New York's Appellate Division for the Second Judicial Department's holding that a lender's voluntary discontinuance of a judicial foreclosure action by itself, whether by court order or stipulation of the parties, is insufficient to evidence a lender's intent to revoke the acceleration of the entire mortgage debt. Now, the legal landscape in New York might drastically change given the Court of Appeals' grant of leave to appeal in Freedom v Engel.

Earlier this year, Hinshaw reported on a decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals which invalidated a Massachusetts foreclosure based on the Court's determination that the mortgage loan servicer's notice of default included additional language which did not strictly comply with Paragraph 22 of the mortgage. In the wake of that decision, the servicer filed a petition for rehearing on several grounds, but primarily because the Code of Massachusetts Regulations required use of what the Court had characterized as additional language. The banking community also filed several amicus briefs in support of Chase's petition.

In US Bank N.A. v. Nelson, the New York Appellate Division for the Second Department held that to raise a challenge to a foreclosing lender's standing it is not sufficient merely to deny the lender's allegations. In prior decisions, the Second Department allowed borrowers to raise a standing defense by mere denial of the allegation in the mortgagee's complaint that the plaintiff was the owner and holder of the note and mortgage being foreclosed. Under Nelson, the Second Department overturned its prior decisions and provided a bright line rule for practitioners in that Department.