Consumer Crossroads: Where Financial Services and Litigation Intersect

Loan servicers and their counsel are often sued by consumers during contested mortgage foreclosure proceedings. The United States Supreme Court’s opinions in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins[1] and TransUnion v. Ramirez[2] continue to be an important precedent in defending consumer claims.

Last week, the Texas Supreme Court answered the Fifth Circuit’s certified question as to whether simultaneous rescission and reacceleration can reset the limitations period under Texas Law by holding that “a rescission that complies with the statute [Tex. Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 16.038] resets limitations even if it is combined with a notice of reacceleration.” Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 23-0525, 2024 Tex. LEXIS 156, at *2 (Feb. 23, 2024).

We previously discussed the State of New York's Appellate Division for the Second Judicial Department's holding that a lender's voluntary discontinuance of a judicial foreclosure action by itself, whether by court order or stipulation of the parties, is insufficient to evidence a lender's intent to revoke the acceleration of the entire mortgage debt. Now, the legal landscape in New York might drastically change given the Court of Appeals' grant of leave to appeal in Freedom v Engel.

A recent Minnesota federal court decision (Hrebal v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC) joined a growing number of courts across the country in finding that a creditor's failure to mark a tradeline as disputed can violate the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) without a consumer having to prove that a reasonable investigation could have uncovered an actual inaccuracy. This trend has created a split between courts in the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits and the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.

In Kirby v. 21 Mortg. Corp., the First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel examined the Kirbys' claim that the 19 written communications they received from their mortgage holder following their Chapter 7 discharge violated the Bankruptcy Code 524(a)(2)'s injunction. The Kirbys further claimed bankruptcy discharge violations arising from their mortgage holder's delivery of an escrow account disclosure, short sale letter, cash-for-keys letter, and right to cure notice for a total of 26 post-discharge bankruptcy communications. Below, we take a closer look at the decision and its comprehensive review of bankruptcy discharge law along with the process for determining whether a post-discharge correspondence violates the bankruptcy code's injunction.

Less than three months after hearing oral arguments in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, Case No. 17-1307, the United States Supreme Court held, in a 9-0 decision, that a business engaged in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings is not a "debt collector" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA, "the Act"), except for the limited prohibitions set forth in 1692(f)(6). The decision provides helpful guidance to law firms and loan servicers who pursue nonjudicial foreclosures.

For mortgage servicers and foreclosure firms, yesterday's oral argument before the Supreme Court in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, U.S. Supreme Court, 17-1307 and the upcoming decision, could be a game changer. At issue: a split in the federal circuits over whether the non-judicial foreclosure of a mortgage constitutes debt collection, as defined by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The State of New York's Appellate Division for the Second Department has now addressed the issue of whether a lender's voluntary discontinuance of a judicial foreclosure action, whether by court order or stipulation of the parties, is sufficient evidence of a lender's intent to revoke the acceleration of the entire mortgage debt. Unfortunately for mortgage lenders, the court determined voluntary discontinuance is not sufficient.