Consumer Crossroads: Where Financial Services and Litigation Intersect

A recent ruling by the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit could signal heightened exposure for lenders and servicers to state escrow-on-interest statutes, along with greater litigation risk.

An ever-expanding review of pre-foreclosure notices of default experienced its latest chapter in the First Circuit's recent decision reversing dismissal of suit in Aubee v. Selene. In Aubee, the borrowers challenged the notice of default they received prior to foreclosure on the grounds that the notice inserted additional language that was misleading and deceptive. The Aubees' mortgage included the standard Paragraph 22 notice of default disclosures requiring the mortgage lender to inform a borrower of the right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense to acceleration and sale. The Aubees' notice of default stated: "You have the right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to assert in the foreclosure proceeding the non-existence of a default and/or the right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense to acceleration, foreclosure and/or sale of the property." The Rhode Island federal court dismissed the case because the notice of default provided the Aubees with all disclosures mandated under Paragraph 22, but the First Circuit reversed.

Massachusetts moved one step closer to resolving an ongoing debate over pre-foreclosure notices of default that started with the First Circuit's decision in Thompson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank back in February of 2019. Initially, the First Circuit concluded that a notice of default, which disclosed that borrowers "could still avoid foreclosure by paying the total past-due amount before a foreclosure sale," was potentially misleading because the mortgage only allowed reinstatement five days before the sale. Chase filed a petition for rehearing, joined by numerous amici, that demanded reconsideration of the First Circuit's decision on grounds that the potentially misleading language was in fact a mandatory disclosure under the Code of Massachusetts Regulations.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit has affirmed an earlier decision that concluded a borrower's right to redeem terminates when the gavel falls at a foreclosure auction, and not when a deed is recorded.

Earlier this year, Hinshaw reported on a decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals which invalidated a Massachusetts foreclosure based on the Court's determination that the mortgage loan servicer's notice of default included additional language which did not strictly comply with Paragraph 22 of the mortgage. In the wake of that decision, the servicer filed a petition for rehearing on several grounds, but primarily because the Code of Massachusetts Regulations required use of what the Court had characterized as additional language. The banking community also filed several amicus briefs in support of Chase's petition.

In Thompson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held a foreclosure was potentially void where terms in the lender's default notice arguably conflicted with terms in Paragraph 19 of the Mortgage. Although Chase's notice of default provided the Thompsons with the disclosures required under Paragraph 22 of the Mortgage, Chase's default notice further stated that the Thompsons "could still avoid foreclosure by paying the total past-due amount before a foreclosure sale takes place." The First Circuit interpreted this additional language as potentially misleading, because advising borrowers that they could make payment up to the time of the foreclosure sale differed from the Mortgage's Paragraph 19, which only allowed a reinstatement payment five days before the sale of the Property.

There are borrowers out there who believe that the Massachusetts Obsolete Mortgage Statute, M.G.L. c. 260 sec. 33, relieves them of their repayment obligations. This statute, amended back in 2006, provides that five years after a mortgage reaches its term (or 35 years after the time the mortgage is recorded where a maturity date is not specified) it will be discharged by operation of law absent the timely recording of an extension or affidavit. The 2006 amendment specifically applied to all existing mortgages. The law is supposed to provide clarity in conveyancing and protect borrowers if their mortgagee or servicer failed to issue a discharge of the mortgage after the mortgage reaches its term.