Consumer Crossroads: Where Financial Services and Litigation Intersect

Loan servicers and their counsel are often sued by consumers during contested mortgage foreclosure proceedings. The United States Supreme Court’s opinions in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins[1] and TransUnion v. Ramirez[2] continue to be an important precedent in defending consumer claims.

Last week, the Texas Supreme Court answered the Fifth Circuit’s certified question as to whether simultaneous rescission and reacceleration can reset the limitations period under Texas Law by holding that “a rescission that complies with the statute [Tex. Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 16.038] resets limitations even if it is combined with a notice of reacceleration.” Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 23-0525, 2024 Tex. LEXIS 156, at *2 (Feb. 23, 2024).

The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court's First Department recently issued a decision addressing the calculation of the six-month timeframe permitted to file a new action, according to New York's Civil Practice Law & Rules (CPLR) 205(a) and following the termination of a prior action. The First Department concluded that an action is timely if it is brought within six months of the termination of time to appeal a denial of a motion to renew.

Last year, as we reported, the Second Circuit requested that the New York Court of Appeals rule on two certified questions concerning predicate notices in foreclosure actions. On March 30, 2021, the Court of Appeals issued its decision in Schiffman on the questions certified by the Second Circuit concerning New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) §§ 1304 (90-day predicate notice) and 1306 (pre-foreclosure filing with the superintendent of banks).

The New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) issued a report on February 4, 2021, detailing its investigation of the mortgage lending market in the Buffalo metropolitan area. The report includes findings about a "distinct lack of lending" by mortgage lenders, particularly nonbank lenders, in neighborhoods with majority-minority populations and to minority homebuyers in general.

The mortgage foreclosure world continues to experience change at a moment's notice. Lenders continue to defend against borrower actions seeking to discharge their mortgages as time-barred, which in turn has led to the development of several defenses supported by the appellate courts. Whether it is lack of standing to accelerate the mortgage debt, revocation, or re-affirmation of the debt, all of these defenses are not as interesting—and powerful—as full immunity from the statute of limitations. In Windward Bora, LLC v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, that's exactly what the Second Circuit found, and its decision could have a substantial impact for lenders in New York and elsewhere.

Massachusetts moved one step closer to resolving an ongoing debate over pre-foreclosure notices of default that started with the First Circuit's decision in Thompson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank back in February of 2019. Initially, the First Circuit concluded that a notice of default, which disclosed that borrowers "could still avoid foreclosure by paying the total past-due amount before a foreclosure sale," was potentially misleading because the mortgage only allowed reinstatement five days before the sale. Chase filed a petition for rehearing, joined by numerous amici, that demanded reconsideration of the First Circuit's decision on grounds that the potentially misleading language was in fact a mandatory disclosure under the Code of Massachusetts Regulations.

On June 17, 2020, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed Senate Bills 8243C and 8428 into law, adding Section 9-x to the Banking Law. The section creates new procedures for mortgagors and servicers in relation to forbearances of residential mortgage payments affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

In a case of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded in Woel v. Christiana Trust that mortgage default notices sent to borrowers must strictly comply with the notice requirements included in a mortgage. The Court held that a lender's notice of default does not strictly comply with the terms of the standard Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac mortgage Paragraph 22, if the notice fails to inform the borrower of the right to reinstate after acceleration.

We previously reported on the impact of the CARES Act on federally backed mortgage loans, including the immediate availability of a 180 – 360 day forbearance plan for borrowers impacted by the pandemic. One key feature of this legislation and accompanying guidance publications is that servicers of GSE loans are required to evaluate borrowers for repayment options—including reinstatement, a repayment plan, modification, or some other workout—at the conclusion of the forbearance period. The forbearance plans do not offer loan forgiveness, and borrowers and their servicers are expected to resolve the forbearance amount at the end of the plan.

On May 7, 2020, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo issued Executive Order 202.28, which provides further temporary relief measures for tenants facing an eviction. The order also directly impacts mortgage loan holders, servicers, and borrowers, as it bars the "initiation" of certain residential and commercial mortgage foreclosures for another 60 days from June 20, 2020.

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Office of Inspector General issued a COVID-19 bulletin for homeowners that revealed the HUD has been monitoring what readily accessible information FHA mortgage servicers are providing to borrowers on their websites. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has already provided guidance to FHA servicers regarding implementation of the CARES Act as it pertains to provisions related to forbearance. However, HUD's Inspector General warned in the bulletin that its review of the top 30 FHA servicers' websites revealed "incomplete, inconsistent, dated, and unclear guidance" to borrowers in connection with their forbearance options under the CARES Act.

On April 20, 2020, Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker signed H.4647 into law. The law establishes a moratorium on foreclosures and evictions for 120 days from the date of the enactment, or 45 days after the COVID-19 Emergency Order is lifted, whichever is sooner, and also extends forbearance to any borrower who requests it due to COVID-19. The law allows the Governor to expand the foreclosure moratorium for a further 90 days, so long as it does not exceed the 45 day limit after the COVID-19 Emergency Order is lifted.

The Second Circuit recently certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the requisite proof needed for borrowers to dispute the lender's compliance with New York Real Property Procedures and Acts ("RPAPL") § 1304 and the required filings under RPAPL § 1306 for a multi-borrower mortgage loan. The New York Court of Appeals has not yet ruled on these statutes and the requisite proof needed to comply with them. A decision on these issues could greatly impact the mortgage industry, given the impact of these statutes on mortgage foreclosure proceedings.

We previously discussed the State of New York's Appellate Division for the Second Judicial Department's holding that a lender's voluntary discontinuance of a judicial foreclosure action by itself, whether by court order or stipulation of the parties, is insufficient to evidence a lender's intent to revoke the acceleration of the entire mortgage debt. Now, the legal landscape in New York might drastically change given the Court of Appeals' grant of leave to appeal in Freedom v Engel.

Earlier this year, Hinshaw reported on a decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals which invalidated a Massachusetts foreclosure based on the Court's determination that the mortgage loan servicer's notice of default included additional language which did not strictly comply with Paragraph 22 of the mortgage. In the wake of that decision, the servicer filed a petition for rehearing on several grounds, but primarily because the Code of Massachusetts Regulations required use of what the Court had characterized as additional language. The banking community also filed several amicus briefs in support of Chase's petition.

A recent Minnesota federal court decision (Hrebal v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC) joined a growing number of courts across the country in finding that a creditor's failure to mark a tradeline as disputed can violate the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) without a consumer having to prove that a reasonable investigation could have uncovered an actual inaccuracy. This trend has created a split between courts in the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits and the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.

In Kirby v. 21 Mortg. Corp., the First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel examined the Kirbys' claim that the 19 written communications they received from their mortgage holder following their Chapter 7 discharge violated the Bankruptcy Code 524(a)(2)'s injunction. The Kirbys further claimed bankruptcy discharge violations arising from their mortgage holder's delivery of an escrow account disclosure, short sale letter, cash-for-keys letter, and right to cure notice for a total of 26 post-discharge bankruptcy communications. Below, we take a closer look at the decision and its comprehensive review of bankruptcy discharge law along with the process for determining whether a post-discharge correspondence violates the bankruptcy code's injunction.

Less than three months after hearing oral arguments in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, Case No. 17-1307, the United States Supreme Court held, in a 9-0 decision, that a business engaged in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings is not a "debt collector" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA, "the Act"), except for the limited prohibitions set forth in 1692(f)(6). The decision provides helpful guidance to law firms and loan servicers who pursue nonjudicial foreclosures.

In Thompson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held a foreclosure was potentially void where terms in the lender's default notice arguably conflicted with terms in Paragraph 19 of the Mortgage. Although Chase's notice of default provided the Thompsons with the disclosures required under Paragraph 22 of the Mortgage, Chase's default notice further stated that the Thompsons "could still avoid foreclosure by paying the total past-due amount before a foreclosure sale takes place." The First Circuit interpreted this additional language as potentially misleading, because advising borrowers that they could make payment up to the time of the foreclosure sale differed from the Mortgage's Paragraph 19, which only allowed a reinstatement payment five days before the sale of the Property.