Consumer Crossroads: Where Financial Services and Litigation Intersect

Loan servicers and their counsel are often sued by consumers during contested mortgage foreclosure proceedings. The United States Supreme Court’s opinions in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins[1] and TransUnion v. Ramirez[2] continue to be an important precedent in defending consumer claims.

Servicers with non-performing loans in Connecticut may find that municipal code violations exist on a property in foreclosure. Commonly referred to as "blight," Connecticut has enacted C.G.S. § 7-148ff, which makes a blight lien a priority lien on real estate.

Last week, the Texas Supreme Court answered the Fifth Circuit’s certified question as to whether simultaneous rescission and reacceleration can reset the limitations period under Texas Law by holding that “a rescission that complies with the statute [Tex. Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 16.038] resets limitations even if it is combined with a notice of reacceleration.” Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 23-0525, 2024 Tex. LEXIS 156, at *2 (Feb. 23, 2024).

A highly contested and controversial legal defense to residential foreclosures in Maine resurfaced earlier this month with the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Finch v. U.S. Bank, N.A.

In a case of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded in Woel v. Christiana Trust that mortgage default notices sent to borrowers must strictly comply with the notice requirements included in a mortgage. The Court held that a lender's notice of default does not strictly comply with the terms of the standard Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac mortgage Paragraph 22, if the notice fails to inform the borrower of the right to reinstate after acceleration.

We previously reported on the impact of the CARES Act on federally backed mortgage loans, including the immediate availability of a 180 – 360 day forbearance plan for borrowers impacted by the pandemic. One key feature of this legislation and accompanying guidance publications is that servicers of GSE loans are required to evaluate borrowers for repayment options—including reinstatement, a repayment plan, modification, or some other workout—at the conclusion of the forbearance period. The forbearance plans do not offer loan forgiveness, and borrowers and their servicers are expected to resolve the forbearance amount at the end of the plan.

On April 20, 2020, Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker signed H.4647 into law. The law establishes a moratorium on foreclosures and evictions for 120 days from the date of the enactment, or 45 days after the COVID-19 Emergency Order is lifted, whichever is sooner, and also extends forbearance to any borrower who requests it due to COVID-19. The law allows the Governor to expand the foreclosure moratorium for a further 90 days, so long as it does not exceed the 45 day limit after the COVID-19 Emergency Order is lifted.

The COVID-19 outbreak has resulted in unprecedented job loss for millions of Americans, creating economic uncertainty and challenges for loan servicers in 2020. Until the outbreak is controlled, missed payments on mortgages and student loans are likely to increase. Already, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) have issued 60 day moratoriums on foreclosures and evictions, which some states—and most banks and mortgage loan servicers—have adopted. Meanwhile, the Department of Education has announced that all borrowers with federal loans will have their interest rates automatically set at 0% for at least 60 days. Late Wednesday night, the Senate passed H.R. 748, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) after senate leadership reached an agreement with the White House earlier in the week. The legislation now moves to the House of Representatives for what many hope is unanimous consent. While we are still waiting on the House of Representative's approval, we've explored measures within the bill that will immediately impact student and mortgage loan servicers and outlined them below.

In response to challenges facing the financial services industry as a result of coronavirus (COVID-19), New York's Department of Financial Services (DFS) has issued a COVID-19 compliance order, along with a series of industry guidance letters related to the organizational preparedness of regulated institutions to manage risks associated with the outbreak.

The Second Circuit recently certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the requisite proof needed for borrowers to dispute the lender's compliance with New York Real Property Procedures and Acts ("RPAPL") § 1304 and the required filings under RPAPL § 1306 for a multi-borrower mortgage loan. The New York Court of Appeals has not yet ruled on these statutes and the requisite proof needed to comply with them. A decision on these issues could greatly impact the mortgage industry, given the impact of these statutes on mortgage foreclosure proceedings.

Earlier this year, Hinshaw reported on a decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals which invalidated a Massachusetts foreclosure based on the Court's determination that the mortgage loan servicer's notice of default included additional language which did not strictly comply with Paragraph 22 of the mortgage. In the wake of that decision, the servicer filed a petition for rehearing on several grounds, but primarily because the Code of Massachusetts Regulations required use of what the Court had characterized as additional language. The banking community also filed several amicus briefs in support of Chase's petition.

In a recent 4-3 decision, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that a borrower was entitled to her appellate attorneys' fees because she was the prevailing party in a judicial foreclosure action in which her mortgagee had voluntarily dropped the appeal. Marie Anne Glass' mortgage loan servicer filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure in December 2013. Glass moved to dismiss the case on grounds that did not challenge the default, but instead argued that her mortgagee failed to allege or demonstrate that it was the proper holder of the note. Ultimately, the trial court granted Glass' motion and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Last year, we reported on a Massachusetts Land Court decision, which interpreted Uniform Commercial Code section 3-309 to conclude that a mortgagee cannot foreclose in reliance upon a lost note affidavit, because the 1990 version of UCC 3-309 requires the party seeking to enforce the note demonstrate possession prior to its loss. 32 states remain under the 1990 version, and recently the Rhode Island Supreme Court joined decisions that prohibit enforcement of a lost note under this outdated version of the UCC. In SMS Fin. v. Corsetti, SMS Financial sued to enforce default on a note that was lost by a prior transferee. Sovereign Bank had loaned the defendants $1 million in exchange for a promissory note and a mortgage on property located at 385 South Main Street in Providence, Rhode Island. Following default and foreclosure, the defendants issued to Sovereign a new promissory note to repay the $200,000 deficiency on the original loan. Sovereign subsequently assigned its interest in the loan to SMS Financial; but, Sovereign had lost the original note so it delivered to SMS a lost note affidavit and an allonge. SMS filed suit against the defendants to collect on breach of the note, but the Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants because SMS could not enforce the lost note.

In Milone v. US Bank, N.A., a New York intermediate appellate court held that a letter to a borrower stating that the failure to cure a mortgage loan default "will result in acceleration" does not start the clock on the statute of limitations to foreclose and recover the entire debt. This ruling differs from that of another New York intermediate appellate court, which had ruled otherwise, setting up the possibility of the New York Court of Appeals weighing in on a key issue in New York foreclosure actions.

After much anticipation, Senate bill 2155—which rolls back major aspects of the Dodd-Frank law—was approved by Congress and was signed into law by President Trump.

In Lubonty v. U.S. Bank National Association, a mortgagor sought to void a mortgage loan claiming that the six-year statute of limitations to foreclose had expired. The mortgagor had commenced multiple bankruptcy proceedings that trigged automatic stays and prevented foreclosure from proceeding for approximately four and a half years. New York law, CPLR § 204, extends the statute of limitations "[w]here the commencement of an action has been stayed by a court or by statutory prohibition," and the trial court held that the six-year statute of limitations was extended by the time period during which the foreclosure was stalled through successive bankruptcy petitions.

A Rhode Island mortgage lender recently rescinded approval of a loan application because the prospective borrower reported income from his employment in Rhode Island's medical marijuana industry. The lender was aware of the borrower's source of income at the time it issued a pre-approval letter, but ultimately denied the loan because the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) will not purchase or invest in a loan where the borrower is employed by, or receives compensation related to, the marijuana industry. FHA's Single Family Housing Policy Handbook provides that a lender may only consider a borrower's income if it is legally derived. Since marijuana remains illegal under federal law, any income derived from the cannabis industry cannot be considered as effective income for purposes of underwriting a loan. The denial of the loan came days after the United States Attorney General rescinded the Cole Memorandum, an internal justice department policy enacted during the Obama administration, which directed federal prosecutors to limit enforcement of federal marijuana laws in states that legalized and regulated cannabis.

In Dan-Harry v. PNC Bank, the Rhode Island federal court concluded that a mortgagor may bring a claim for damages and other remedies against a mortgagee on allegations of failure to conduct a pre-foreclosure face-to-face meeting required for breach of an FHA-insured mortgage. Dawari Dan-Harry obtained an FHA-insured mortgage loan to purchase property in Providence, Rhode Island, which included in Paragraph 9(d) the following provisions: "Regulations of HUD Secretary. In many circumstances regulations issued by the Secretary will limit Lender's rights, in the case of payment defaults, to require immediate payment in full, and foreclose if not paid. This Security Instrument does not authorize acceleration or foreclosure if not permitted by regulations of the Secretary." PNC Bank foreclosed on the mortgage and sold the property at auction to a third-party in January 2017. While continuing to occupy the property, Dan-Harry sued PNC for damages and to void the foreclosure sale on allegations that PNC failed to comply with HUD regulation 24 C.F.R. § 203.604(b), which requires a mortgagee to have a face-to-face meeting with the mortgagor or make a reasonable effort to arrange such a meeting before the mortgage becomes three months delinquent in payments.

While Illinois mortgagees have the option of recouping delinquent mortgage loan debt through different types of lawsuits, the pursuit of this option can violate Illinois' prohibition on refiling the same cause of action. A recent decision illustrates the pitfalls of a mortgagee's numerous lawsuits filed on the same default and debt in reliance upon Illinois' savings statute.

The Maine Supreme Court, using a recent interpretation of the business records exception to the hearsay rule under Maine law, has raised questions regarding mortgage loan servicers' ability to foreclose on defaulted borrowers. An essential element of proof in any Maine judicial foreclosure action includes evidence of default, and in Key Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Estate of Quint, the Court affirmed exclusion of a prior servicer's screenshots submitted to demonstrate the amount a borrower owed, costs incurred and the outstanding principal balance in pursuit of a judicial foreclosure action. The current servicer's witness testified to establish default on review of the prior servicer's business records and under exception to hearsay, but the trial judge concluded that the witness had not established the hearsay exception with regard to records of the prior servicer.