Consumer Crossroads: Where Financial Services and Litigation Intersect

On March 23, 2023, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision in CFPB v. Law Offices of Crystal Moroney (Moroney). The case reviewed constitutional challenges to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB) funding structure previously decided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals last October in Community Financial Services Association of America, Ltd. v. CFPB (Community Financial). In Community Financial, the Fifth Circuit vacated the CFPB's 2017 "Payday Lending Rule" on the grounds that it was invalid "as the product of the Bureau's unconstitutional funding scheme." The CFPB's petition for writ of certiorari was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court in February.

On May 10, 2021, ruling on an issue of first impression, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Maddox v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust affirmed denial of BNY Mellon's motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that plaintiffs have Article III standing to sue over the alleged violation of legal interests created by New York State statute. The ruling has important implications for mortgage lenders and their servicers.

Last year, as we reported, the Second Circuit requested that the New York Court of Appeals rule on two certified questions concerning predicate notices in foreclosure actions. On March 30, 2021, the Court of Appeals issued its decision in Schiffman on the questions certified by the Second Circuit concerning New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) §§ 1304 (90-day predicate notice) and 1306 (pre-foreclosure filing with the superintendent of banks).

The mortgage foreclosure world continues to experience change at a moment's notice. Lenders continue to defend against borrower actions seeking to discharge their mortgages as time-barred, which in turn has led to the development of several defenses supported by the appellate courts. Whether it is lack of standing to accelerate the mortgage debt, revocation, or re-affirmation of the debt, all of these defenses are not as interesting—and powerful—as full immunity from the statute of limitations. In Windward Bora, LLC v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, that's exactly what the Second Circuit found, and its decision could have a substantial impact for lenders in New York and elsewhere.

Hinshaw continues to monitor the deepening circuit split over what constitutes an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which restricts certain automated calls and text messages. To say there has been substantial debate by the courts and FCC concerning what constitutes an ATDS would be putting it lightly. And, just when it seemed a majority position was emerging, the playing field seems to have leveled with the Second Circuit's decision in Duran v. La Boom Disco, Inc.

The Second Circuit recently certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the requisite proof needed for borrowers to dispute the lender's compliance with New York Real Property Procedures and Acts ("RPAPL") § 1304 and the required filings under RPAPL § 1306 for a multi-borrower mortgage loan. The New York Court of Appeals has not yet ruled on these statutes and the requisite proof needed to comply with them. A decision on these issues could greatly impact the mortgage industry, given the impact of these statutes on mortgage foreclosure proceedings.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently took the opportunity to apply its 2018 holding in Cohen v. Rosicki, which had held that a consumer pursuing a claim for violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a material misrepresentation. Materiality depends on "whether the false statement would frustrate a consumer's ability to intelligently choose his or her response," or if the representation "could mislead the debtor as to the negate and legal status of the underlying debt," or "could impede the consumer's ability to respond to or dispute collection."

We previously discussed Avila v. Reliant (Avila II) and U.S. District Court Judge Spatt’s dismissal of a consumer’s attempt to sue on the “safe harbor” language she helped establish in Avila v. Riexinger & Associates (Avila I). As predicted, Avila II was appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Although the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal, the Court did not address Judge Spatt’s reasoning for the dismissal.

Following the Second Circuit's 2016 decision in Avila v. Riexinger & Associates (Avila I), consumer plaintiff Annmarie Avila returned to court in Avila v. Reliant (Avila II) to sue for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) under the so called "safe-harbor" provision she helped establish in her previous successful appeal.

The Second Circuit, in King v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., and the Third Circuit, in Dominguez v. Yahoo!, Inc., relied upon the D.C. Circuit's decision in ACA International v. FCC in limiting the definition of an autodialer under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Dominguez found that Yahoo's text message system did not fit the definition of autodialer, while King emphasized that only a device that currently has the ability to perform autodialing functions can qualify as an autodialer system.

At the close of a 108 page decision filed in response to motions to dismiss a CFPB enforcement action, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, C.A. No. 17-cv-890, Judge Loretta Preska of the U.S. District for the Southern District of New York (within Second Circuit jurisdiction) granted the motions by concluding the CFPB's structure was unconstitutional. This is significant because the D.C. Circuit had determined en banc earlier this year that the CFPB was constitutional in PHH Corp. v. CFPB.

The Court of Appeals seems to have halted much uncertainty surrounding "reverse Avila" claims by unanimously affirming the New York federal court's decision in Taylor v. Financial Recovery Services, Inc., No. 17-1650, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS ------- (2d Cir. March 29, 2018) (found here). In the wake of Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., LLC, 817 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2016), savvy plaintiffs have argued that the failure to disclose that a debt is no longer accruing interest is false and misleading in violation of Section 1692e of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The Second Circuit disagreed and held that "a collection notice that fails to disclose that interest and fees are not currently accruing on a debt is not misleading " when the letter correctly states a consumer's balance when the letter was issued.