Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP is pleased to announce that 80 lawyers are recognized in the 2026 edition of The Best Lawyers in America, with ten receiving this honor for the first time. Additionally, 22 Hinshaw lawyers are included in The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch.

Thomas Schrimpf has been selected by the State of Wisconsin to the 2024 Wisconsin Pro Bono Honor Society. This marks his fourth consecutive year of being named to the society.

The national law firm of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP is pleased to announce that 75 of the firm's lawyers have been selected by their peers for inclusion in the 2025 edition of The Best Lawyers in America. In addition, 30 Hinshaw lawyers were selected by their peers for inclusion in the 2025 edition of The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch.

Mollie Kugler, Tom Schrimpf, and Drew Trevino authored an article titled "Defense Cost Issues under D&O Policies," published in the First Quarter 2019 edition of the Professional Liability Underwriting Society (PLUS) Journal. Having noted the sparsity of state case law interpreting D&O policies, the authors explore how jurisdictions across the country have applied traditional "duty to defend" rules to the defense cost reimbursement obligation in D&O policies, as well as other policies with similar reimbursement language.

Milwaukee-based Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP partners Russell A. Klingaman and Thomas R. Schrimpf were quoted in a Wisconsin Law Journal article addressing the evolving legal landscape — at the state and federal levels — involving drones. The article, "Up in the Air: Drones Changing Legal Field up in the Air: Drones Changing Legal Field," was published in September 2015 issue of the magazine.

Milwaukee-based Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP partners Russell A. Klingaman and Thomas R. Schrimpf authored the article "Recreational Drones: Do Homeowners’ Insurance Policies Provide Coverage?," which was published August 4, 2015 in Claims Journal. The article addresses the question of the extent to which, if at all, a homeowners' insurance policy will cover a claim for damage done by the policyholder's recreational drone.

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals recently rejected a medical monitoring claim, holding that “[i]ncreased risk of future harm is not an actual injury under Wisconsin law.” Alsteen v. Wauleco, Appeal No. 2010AP1643, 2011 WL 2314988, (Wis. App.  June 14, 2011). In Alsteen, 70 plaintiffs alleged that they were exposed to carcinogenic chemicals that Wauleco improperly released from a nearby window factory. Plaintiffs did not allege that they suffered from any present health problems due to this exposure. Instead plaintiffs contended that they were at an increased risk of developing cancer in the future and sought damages for future medical monitoring expenses. Wauleco moved to dismiss, contending that Wisconsin law requires a plaintiff to allege actual injury in order to state a tort claim and that because plaintiffs only alleged future harm, they had not alleged an actual injury. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim. The appellate court affirmed, holding that “Wisconsin law requires actual injury before a plaintiff may recover in tort and [plaintiffs had] not alleged any actual injury.” Moreover, the court stated:

Over the last week, pandemic-related insurance lawsuits have continued to be filed nationwide. Several new notable class action filings were recently submitted in Wisconsin state and federal courts that seek business interruption insurance coverage.

Recently, in Heinecke v. Aurora Healthcare Inc., the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that a decorative art fountain was not “a good or product for consumption” within the meaning of a “consumption exception” contained in an insurance policy's Fungi or Bacteria exclusion. The Heinecke case arose from a Legionnaire’s disease outbreak caused by exposure to Legionnella bacteria found in water contained in a decorative art fountain constructed by the insured and located in the lobby of Aurora St. Luke's South Shore Hospital. Specifically, the court found that defining a decorative art fountain as “a good or product intended for consumption” did not comport with the parties’ objectively reasonable expectations. 

By: Thomas R. Schrimpf The Wisconsin Supreme Court has refined the interpretation of “occurrence,” holding that a series of intentional acts resulting in an unexpected and unintended injury is not an accident within the scope of the insuring agreement in a liability policy. See Marshall Schinner v. Michael Gundrum and West Bend Insurance Company, 2013 WI 71. The insured hosted an underage drinking party at a shed owned by a family business. One of insured’s many guests assaulted and seriously injured another guest. The insured knew that the perpetrator had a tendency to become belligerent when intoxicated, but permitted him to drink anyway. The victim sued the insured for negligence in failing to control his guest and for a statutory violation of serving alcohol to minors. The insurer disputed coverage on the grounds that the insured’s actions as a party host were intentional; thus, there was no “occurrence” under the family’s homeowner’s policy. The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed.The policy defined the term “occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” In analyzing whether there was an “occurrence” under the facts, the Supreme Court held that when an insured is seeking coverage, the determination of whether an injury is accidental under a liability policy should be viewed from the standpoint of the insured. Significantly, the Court held that to determine that the harm was not an accident, it was not necessary to find that the insured intended the harm, or even knew with substantial certainty that harm would occur. Instead, to assess the existence of an accident, one must focus on the “means or cause” of harm to determine whether it was truly accidental, even if the result was unexpected. After reviewing the evidence, the Court observed that the insured took a number of intentional actions that were a “substantial factor” in causing the victim’s injuries: the insured hosted the party; actively promoted heavy drinking; procured alcohol for the perpetrator and other minors; knew that the perpetrator was an underage individual who became belligerent when intoxicated; and encouraged, advised and assisted the perpetrator in his consumption of alcohol. The insured’s actions were entirely volitional. He did not host the underage drinking party by mistake, against his will or by chance. The facts established that intent, volition, knowledge and foreseeability were all present. Consequently, the insured’s conduct was not accidental. There was no “occurrence” triggering coverage under the homeowner’s policy.The Court also observed that public policy weighed against finding an “occurrence” under the facts presented. It is against public policy for an insurance contract to provide coverage for an insured’s intentional or willful misconduct. Finding an “occurrence” under the facts presented would allow the host to escape responsibility for his intentional and illegal actions and would send the wrong message about underage drinking parties. The court did not believe that a reasonable insured would expect coverage for bodily injury resulting from his hosting of a large, illegal underage drinking party.Finally, the Court noted that even assuming there was a covered “occurrence,” coverage was excluded because the injury arose out of the use of an isolated shed on uninsured premises. Practice NoteThe decision, by focusing on the intentional conduct of the insured as opposed to the unexpected result in defining an “occurrence” represents a departure from prior case law which held that intentional acts constitute an “occurrence” if the injury is unexpected or unintended. The impact of the decision could be far reaching because many accidents are the result of a series of intentional acts gone awry. For example, an insured stops at the local watering hole and has a few too many drinks before leaving. Because he is late for dinner, he drives too fast. Due to his alcohol impairment and speed, he is unable to stop before striking another vehicle which had slowed down ahead of him. Although the result may have been unexpected and unintended, the cause was a series of intentional acts by the insured. Whether courts will extend the Gundrum analysis beyond the aggravated facts of that case to this more traditional setting will certainly be the focus of coverage litigation in the future. Download PDF