Consumer Crossroads: Where Financial Services and Litigation Intersect

Last week, the Texas Supreme Court answered the Fifth Circuit’s certified question as to whether simultaneous rescission and reacceleration can reset the limitations period under Texas Law by holding that “a rescission that complies with the statute [Tex. Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 16.038] resets limitations even if it is combined with a notice of reacceleration.” Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 23-0525, 2024 Tex. LEXIS 156, at *2 (Feb. 23, 2024).

On October 29, 2021, the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) posted proposed amendments to its debt collection rules for Third-Party Debt Collectors and Debt Buyers (under 23 New York Codes, Rules, and Regulations Part 1) that could significantly change procedures for communicating with consumers.

The New York Court of Appeals reversed four Appellate Division decisions and decided in favor of the mortgagees in a consolidated decision issued on February 18, 2021, ruling, inter alia, that:

The mortgage foreclosure world continues to experience change at a moment's notice. Lenders continue to defend against borrower actions seeking to discharge their mortgages as time-barred, which in turn has led to the development of several defenses supported by the appellate courts. Whether it is lack of standing to accelerate the mortgage debt, revocation, or re-affirmation of the debt, all of these defenses are not as interesting—and powerful—as full immunity from the statute of limitations. In Windward Bora, LLC v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, that's exactly what the Second Circuit found, and its decision could have a substantial impact for lenders in New York and elsewhere.

On April 3, 2020, New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo signed New York's 2021 Executive Budget into law. Many of Governor Cuomo's and lawmakers' legislative agenda priorities were not included in the budget, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Notably, Governor Cuomo's call for formal licensing and regulation of the debt collection industry was removed from the final budget.

Earlier this year, this blog reported on the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Rotkiske v. Klemm to resolve a split in circuits on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's (FDCPA) statute of limitations. This week, in an 8:1 opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court concluded that the one-year statute of limitations in the FDCPA begins to run when the violation occurs, not when the violation is discovered. In doing so, they overturned rulings by the Fourth and Ninth Circuit, which had held the FDCPA's statute of limitations was subject to equitable tolling.

We previously discussed the State of New York's Appellate Division for the Second Judicial Department's holding that a lender's voluntary discontinuance of a judicial foreclosure action by itself, whether by court order or stipulation of the parties, is insufficient to evidence a lender's intent to revoke the acceleration of the entire mortgage debt. Now, the legal landscape in New York might drastically change given the Court of Appeals' grant of leave to appeal in Freedom v Engel.

As we predicted last year, the United States Supreme Court earlier this week granted Plaintiff's petition for certiorari in Rotkiske v. Klemm to resolve a split in the circuits on whether the statute of limitations for a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claim begins when the alleged violation occurred (known as the "occurrence rule") or when the consumer discovers the alleged violation (known as the "discovery rule").

In Milone v. US Bank, N.A., a New York intermediate appellate court held that a letter to a borrower stating that the failure to cure a mortgage loan default "will result in acceleration" does not start the clock on the statute of limitations to foreclose and recover the entire debt. This ruling differs from that of another New York intermediate appellate court, which had ruled otherwise, setting up the possibility of the New York Court of Appeals weighing in on a key issue in New York foreclosure actions.

In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court held on June 11, 2018 that a pending motion for class certification does not toll the statute of limitations for the filing of a new class action lawsuit by a putative class member. Writing for the majority in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg repeatedly emphasized that the "efficiency and economy of litigation" is not promoted by allowing less than diligent plaintiffs to file a new, but time-barred, class action lawsuit. Clarifying the Court's prior holding in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), Justice Ginsburg wrote that "[e]ndless tolling is not the result envisioned by American Pipe."

In Rotkiske v. Klemm, the Third Circuit ruled that the statute of limitations for a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claim begins to toll on the date of the alleged violation, not when the plaintiff discovers the violation. That's significant, because the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have ruled otherwise.

In Lubonty v. U.S. Bank National Association, a mortgagor sought to void a mortgage loan claiming that the six-year statute of limitations to foreclose had expired. The mortgagor had commenced multiple bankruptcy proceedings that trigged automatic stays and prevented foreclosure from proceeding for approximately four and a half years. New York law, CPLR § 204, extends the statute of limitations "[w]here the commencement of an action has been stayed by a court or by statutory prohibition," and the trial court held that the six-year statute of limitations was extended by the time period during which the foreclosure was stalled through successive bankruptcy petitions.