Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP is pleased to announce that 80 lawyers are recognized in the 2026 edition of The Best Lawyers in America, with ten receiving this honor for the first time. Additionally, 22 Hinshaw lawyers are included in The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch.

The national law firm of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP is pleased to announce that 75 of the firm's lawyers have been selected by their peers for inclusion in the 2025 edition of The Best Lawyers in America. In addition, 30 Hinshaw lawyers were selected by their peers for inclusion in the 2025 edition of The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch.

The national law firm of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP is pleased to announce that 73 of the firm's lawyers have been selected by their peers for inclusion in the 2024 edition of The Best Lawyers in America. In addition, 28 Hinshaw lawyers were selected by their peers for inclusion in the 2024 edition of The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch.

Hinshaw partner David Grossbaum has authored a byline in Law360 titled "Lessons From Lawyer Fee-Sharing Agreements Gone Wrong." A recent case—Edelson, P.C. v. Girardi, et al.—has put a spotlight on what can happen when a fee-sharing agreement goes bad.

Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP partner David A. Grossbaum will present "Recent Legal Malpractice Insurance Coverage Decisions and How You can Avoid Losing Your Coverage," during a West LegalEd Center live webcast on January 24, 2014, from 12:00 p.m. to 1:00p.m.

By: David A. Grossbaum

In Cragg v. Allstate Indemnity Corporation, the New York Court of Appeals was called upon to interpret an exclusion stating that “we do not cover bodily injury to an insured person . . . whenever any benefit of this coverage would accrue directly or indirectly to an insured person.” Plaintiff was the father of the decedent child. The decedent and her mother lived with the named insureds, who were the decedent’s grandparents. As residents of the household, the decedent and her mother were insureds under the policy. The decedent drowned accidentally in the grandparent’s swimming pool. The father did not live in the same residence and was not an insured. He sued, as administrator of the decedent’s estate, for wrongful death and for conscious pain and suffering. At the outset, the Court noted that conscious pain and suffering is a claim that compensates the decedent, whereas a wrongful death claim compensates the survivors. In a declaratory judgment action filed against the insurer, the trial court granted the carrier’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the insurer had no obligation to defend or indemnify the mother or the grandparents for any of the father’s claims. In affirming, the appellate division relied on the general purpose of homeowner’s policies, namely to provide coverage arising from injuries to someone other than an insured person. The Court of Appeals noted that the father was then presently only asserting a claim to wrongful death benefits, which belonged to him. He was no longer asserting a claim for pain and suffering, which belonged to the decedent. The Court found the exclusion ambiguous because it was subject to two different interpretations. The interpretation suggested by the insurer was that where an insured person is injured, no insured under the policy is entitled to any benefit from the policy, including defense or indemnification for the lawsuit. The father pointed out that this interpretation only gave meaning to the first part of the exclusion: “we do not cover bodily injury to an insured person,” but not to the second clause: “whenever any benefit of this coverage would accrue directly or indirectly to an insured.” Because an insured would always be obtaining benefits (defense and indemnity) under the policy if there was coverage for bodily injury to an insured, the insurer’s interpretation rendered the second clause meaningless. Therefore, the Court interpreted the “benefit” that must inure directly or indirectly to the insured as something other than simply defense or indemnity under the policy. Rather the exclusion only applied when “an insured” was the one who received the actual payments provided by the policy. Because the father was not an insured and was seeking the policy proceeds on his own behalf under the wrongful death claim, his action was not excluded and the grandparents and the mother were entitled to defense and indemnity. The Court noted that the then current version of the exclusion resulted from a 1990 court decision, when the exclusion simply applied to any bodily injury to an insured. In that earlier case, Allstate Insurance Company v. Pestar, 168 A.D. 2d 931, an insured child was injured when she dove into a state-owned lake. The child sued the state for injuries. The state, in turn, sued the parents for contribution. Notwithstanding the broadness of the exclusion, the court found coverage under the policy because the claim against the insured parents was brought by the state for equitable apportionment, and was not a claim directly by the insured injured child. In an effort to avoid coverage for these types of claims, insurers added the phrase “whenever any benefit of this coverage would accrue directly or indirectly to an insured person.” The Cragg court stated that this attempt to broaden the exclusion did not work and that the insurer actually narrowed the exclusion to those situations where an insured would receive policy proceeds. While there are strong policy reasons to exclude claims that arise out of an injury to an insured person, namely that the insured defendants would not be inclined to cooperate with the insurer and will desire that the policy pay the benefits claimed, other courts interpreting this exclusion have come to the same conclusion as the Court of Appeals. Practice noteWhen an insurer attempts to deal with a court ruling by way of amending an exclusion, it must do so in clear and unequivocal terms, in light of the principle that exclusions will always be interpreted narrowly. Additionally, while the courts might recognize that there is a public policy reason to exclude a particular loss, if the policy does not clearly do so, the courts cannot vindicate that policy.

By its recent decision in an insurance coverage case, Pekin Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d 446, 930 N.E.2d 1011 (Ill.2010), the Illinois Supreme Court arguably broadened the examination necessary to determine the defense obligation. Pekin Insurance Co., a commercial general liability insurer, brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that it did not owe the insured a duty to defend in the underlying suit for assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Illinois Supreme Court held that there was potential for coverage with respect to the complaint, even though the Pekin CGL policy contained an exclusion for intentional acts, because there were allegations of self-defense in the insured’s counterclaim.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the determination of an insurer’s duty to defend therefore need not be based solely upon allegations of the complaint in the underlying action, but may include considerations of other pleadings in the lawsuit including, in this case the policyholder’s counterclaim alleging self-defense. The Court reasoned that if the trial court were to look solely to the complaint in the underlying action to determine coverage, declaratory proceedings would be little more than a useless exercise and failure to consider all of the pleadings would diminish the purpose of a declaratory judgment in settling and fixing the rights of the parties.The Illinois Supreme Court quoted approvingly from the opinion in America Economy Insurance v. Holabird and Root, 382 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 320 Ill. Dec. 97, 886 N.E.2d 1166 (2008). The Illinois First District Appellate Court ruled in that case:

The recent case of Edelson, P.C. v. Girardi, et al.[i] shows what can happen when a fee-sharing agreement goes bad. Edelson, P.C. claims that it acted as Illinois local co-counsel for California law firm Girardi Keese under an agreement to share the contingent fees for the handling of airplane crash cases. Girardi Keese claims that the fee-sharing agreement between it and Edelson in 2019 did not comply with the applicable rules of professional conduct and state law governing these agreements and, therefore, Edelson, P.C. is not entitled to its share of the fee. Specifically, Girardi Keese alleges that the clients did not consent in writing to the fee-sharing agreement between the two law firms. When Girardi Keese raised this issue, Edelson, P.C. obtained the clients' signed consents in 2021, after the cases had settled. Edelson, P.C. also made claims for recovery under a quantum meruit theory.