Employment Law Observer

On Thursday, September 3, 2020, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued an Opinion Letter shedding light on the agency's own ability to sue employers under Section 707(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The letter clarifies two notable areas for employers. First, the EEOC does not have broad authority to file a civil lawsuit against an employer under Title VII without a finding of discrimination or retaliation. Second, the EEOC must follow procedural guidelines—investigate a charge of discrimination, find reasonable cause, attempt to remedy such practice by conciliation—before a civil lawsuit may be filed.

Ever since the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, plaintiff employment lawyers have struggled with how best to assert a viable claim of disparate impact age discrimination. The concept of disparate impact discrimination was recognized by the Supreme Court decades ago in Griggs v. Duke Power, which established that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it unlawful—even if facially neutral—for employer practices to have a materially adverse impact on a protected group, unless the neutral practice is supported by business necessity.

Earlier this week, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a Missouri district court's decision in Von Kaenel v. Armstrong Teasdale, LLP. This case of first impression for the circuit court involved an equity partner at Armstrong Teasdale LLP, Joseph S. von Kaenel, who was forced out at age 70 at the conclusion of 2014. He alleged that but for the firm's mandatory retirement policy in the firm's partnership agreement, he would have retired at or around 75. He filed suit in federal court, where the central issue was whether he was an employee covered under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The Eighth Circuit concluded that he was not an employee covered by the ADEA.

In a split decision, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held en banc that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's (ADEA) protections against disparate impact age discrimination do not extend to applicants. Rather, they apply only to employees.

In a recent 8-0 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision holding the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) applies to public employers of any size.

In honor of the golden anniversary of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the EEOC issued a report entitled "The State of Age Discrimination & Older Workers in the U.S. 50 Years After the ADEA." At a time when sex and race issues are at the forefront of the news, the EEOC reminds us that older workers face struggles of their own obtaining and retaining employment.

If your company hires in Illinois, Indiana, or Wisconsin, and uses years of experience ranges in job postings, it is time to break out the red pen and strike the upper end of those ranges. In a 2-1 opinion, the 7th Circuit recently held the disparate impact provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) protects outside job applicants as well as internal job applicants. Now, hiring practices that disparately impact outside applicants over age 40 are unlawful. Applying that ruling in the case before it, the court revived a disparate impact lawsuit claiming experience caps disparately impacted older workers in violation of the ADEA.

When former District of Columbia Police Chief Cathy Lanier stepped into her new role as security chief for the National Football League (“NFL”), she let it be known there was a “new sheriff in town,” a federal lawsuit alleges. About one year later, the NFL fired 9 security representatives accounting for approximately 1/3rd of the league’s staffing for the position and approximately 75% of the security representatives who were of the of age 60 or older. The security personnel promptly filed a federal suit in the Southern District of New York.

In Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire District, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) applies to public employers of any size.

The chemical company worker was terminated in March 2009 due to an industrial accident. The worker challenged the termination through his union, and the union filed a grievance on his behalf. The employer denied the grievance, which prompted the union to file for arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. The parties were ultimately able to reach a resolution prior to the arbitration. The worker and the employer entered into a settlement agreement and release of claims related to his termination. 

After the financial services employee was terminated, he filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming that his employer discriminated against him in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and New York state law. The parties ultimately resolved the dispute for $250,000. When making the payment, the employer withheld taxes pursuant to the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA). The employee claimed that this was improper and filed suit, seeking a refund of the $4,218 withholding.

A product engineer took an approved four-week leave of absence to visit family in Gaza, but upon return, security issues rendered it impossible for him to return to the United States prior to the end of his leave. His employer extended his leave for another 45 days. On the day he was scheduled to be terminated for failure to return to work, the employee sent an email to his supervisors advising that he was finally able to exit Israel and was trying to get a flight back to the United States.The employee returned to work roughly one week later and was informed that he had been terminated.

A mammography technician with epilepsy had suffered numerous seizures at work. The technician suffered epileptic seizures unpredictably, and they caused her to lose orientation and muscle control, which led to falls and injuries. The risk of injury to the technician and patients was too great, and the employer placed her on paid administrative leave. The employer thereafter made various other accommodations in order to eliminate environmental triggers to her seizures. Though she returned to work, the seizures continued. Her continued seizures and failure to find a accommodation led to the employer placing the technician on unpaid administrative leave. Once she began taking medicine to help control her seizures, the employer offered to reinstate her, but she refused. 

Not all well-designed plans succeed. In the area of employment terminations, however, the practice of having termination decisions made independently by someone other than the employee's immediate supervisor increases the odds of obtaining summary judgment and avoiding trial.

The case of Kragor v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc., No. 11-16052 (11th Cir. December 20, 2012) reminds employers how easily summary judgment can slip away in a discrimination case based on statements attributed to senior management. The court started its analysis with a quote from the mathematician, physicist, and philosopher Blaise Pascal. "Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor the lack of contradiction a sign of truth." Given that plaintiff appealed a summary judgment granted to the employer, such words signaled a reversal on appeal.

During the course of an investigation into employees fraudulently submitting falsified customer service surveys, a 60 year-old employee was terminated. He subsequently filed an age-discrimination claim in Texas state court pursuant to the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) and the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In support of his claim, he claimed his co-workers called him names like "old man," "old fart," "pops," and "grandpa," but he never reported this before he was terminated. The District Court granted summary judgment on behalf of the employer. The employee appealed, contending the District Court 1) used the wrong causation standard in analyzing his termination and 2) erred in granting summary judgment on his hostile work environment claim.

An Army employee filed suit against the Secretary of the Army and the United States Army Corps of Engineers alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") after he was not interviewed and his applications for two promotions were denied. The lower court relied upon the newer Gross v. FBL Financial standard of determining causation in an ADEA case, and found that the employee could not demonstrate that “but for” his age, he would have been given the position(s).

In a matter of first impression, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment in favor of the employer and permitted the employee to proceed with his harassment claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 

Upon his termination, a 62-year-old photo editor was provided with a severance package including 20 weeks’ salary and other benefits. In exchange for it, he signed a separation agreement, which contained a provision stating that he waived and released any and all claims against the employer including claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The separation agreement further provided that nothing in it restricted the employee’s right under the ADEA to challenge the agreement’s validity. It also stated that the waiver and release do not apply to any ADEA claims that might arise after the date that the employee signed the separation agreement. Two years later, the employee sued the employer, alleging that his termination was a pretext for age discrimination in violation of the ADEA because his position remained extant and was filled by a younger employee. The employer argued that the employee’s claim was precluded by the separation agreement’s waiver provision. The employee countered that the waiver provision was not enforceable because it was unduly lengthy and confusing in violation of the requirements of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the employer had satisfied the OWBPA’s requirements because the waiver provision was written in a manner calculated to be understood by its relevant employees. To ensure that waiver provisions are enforceable under the OWBPA, they must be drafted so that employees can understand what the waiver’s effect will be.