An Ohio Appellate Court recently held that a five-year old Ohio statute barred all secondhand or “take home” asbestos exposure suits against premises owners. Adams vs. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Ohio Ct. App., No. 91404 (Feb. 5, 2009). Clayton Adams was an employee at the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Goodyear) from 1973 to 1983. During that time, he was occupationally exposed to various asbestos-containing products which as a result, were brought home with him on his clothing. Mary Adams, Clayton’s wife, always shook out her husband’s dusty work clothes before washing them. She would have breathed in that asbestos dust. Mrs. Adams was diagnosed with mesothelioma in March 2007, resulting in her death in July 2007. The record established that Mary was never present at the Goodyear plant.

Goodyear moved for summary judgment contending that plaintiffs’ claims were barred under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.941(A)(1), which states:

The following apply to all tort actions for asbestos claims brought against a premises owner to recover damages or other relief for exposure to asbestos on the premises owner’s property: A premises owner is not liable for any injury to any individual resulting from asbestos exposure unless that individual’s alleged exposure occurred while the individual was at the premises owner’s property.

Goodyear argued that it did not owe Mrs. Adams any duty of care under the plain language of the statute.

Plaintiffs argued that their claim against Goodyear was only for negligence, not premises liability. Moreover, they argued that the statute only applied to damages resulting from asbestos exposure while the individual was on the premises owner’s property. The trial court rejected both arguments and granted summary judgment in favor of Goodyear.

In interpreting the statute at issue, the Ohio Appellate Court stated:

A court’s paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute. In determining legislative intent, the court first looks to the language in the statute and the purpose to be accomplished. Words used in a statute must be taken in their usual, normal and customary meaning. It is the duty of the court to give effect to the words used and not to insert words not used. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need to apply rules of statutory interpretation.

The court found that plaintiffs’ interpretation of the statute at issue would make the statute utterly meaningless, stating: “When R.C. 2307.941(A) is read as a whole, it is clear that the focus is on the presence of asbestos on the premises, not the presence of the individual on the premises.” While the dust came from her husband’s workplace when she shook out his work clothes, it is clear that Mary Adams’ asbestos exposure did not occur at Goodyear’s plant. “Because R.C. 2307.941(A)(1) bars recovery for injury where the individual was not exposed to asbestos on the defendant’s property, we find that Mary’s claims fail as a matter of law.” Moreover, because legal duty goes hand-in-hand with whether the injury was foreseeable, Goodyear did not owe Mary Adams any such duty; her exposure did not occur on Goodyear’s premises. It could not have been foreseeable for Goodyear to expect that Mary would sustain any such alleged exposure to asbestos. Plaintiffs’ negligence claim therefore also failed as a matter of law. 

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